CONNICK v. THOMPSON(No. 09-571)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-571.ZS.htmlArgued: October 6, 2010
Decided: March 29, 2011Opinion author: Thomas
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Petitioner the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office
concedes that, in prosecuting respondent Thompson for attempted
armed robbery, prosecutors violated Brady v. Maryland ,
373 U. S. 83 , by failing to disclose a crime lab report.
Because of his robbery conviction, Thompson elected not
to testify at his later murder trial and was convicted.
A month before his scheduled execution, the lab report
was discovered. A reviewing court vacated both convictions,
and Thompson was found not guilty in a retrial on the murder
charge. He then filed suit against the district attorney's
office under 42 U. S. C. sec.1983, alleging , inter alia
, that the Brady violation was caused by the office's deliberate
indifference to an obvious need to train prosecutors to
avoid such constitutional violations. The district court
held that, to prove deliberate indifference, Thompson did
not need to show a pattern of similar Brady violations
when he could demonstrate that the need for training was
obvious. The jury found the district attorney's office
liable for failure to train and awarded Thompson damages.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court.
Held: A district attorney's office may not be held liable
under sec.1983 for failure to train its prosecutors based
on a single Brady violation. Pp. 6-20. (a) Plaintiffs seeking to impose sec.1983 liability on
local governments must prove that their injury was caused
by "action pursuant to official municipal policy," which
includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the
acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent
and widespread as to practically have the force of law.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 436 U.
S. 658 . A local government's decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens'
rights may rise to the level of an official government
policy for sec.1983 purposes, but the failure to train
must amount to "deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact."
Canton v. Harris , 489 U. S. 378 . Deliberate indifference
in this context requires proof that city policymakers disregarded
the "known or obvious consequence" that a particular omission
in their training program would cause city employees to
violate citizens' constitutional rights. Board of Comm'rs
of Bryan Cty. v. Brown , 520 U. S. 397 . Pp. 6-9.
(b) A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is "ordinarily necessary" to demonstrate deliberate
indifference. Bryan Cty., supra , at 409. Without notice
that a course of training is deficient, decisionmakers
can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.
Thompson does not contend that he proved a pattern of similar
Brady violations, and four reversals by Louisiana courts
for dissimilar Brady violations in the 10 years before
the robbery trial could not have put the district attorney's
office on notice of the need for specific training. Pp.
9-10.
(c) Thompson mistakenly relies on the "single-incident"
liability hypothesized in Canton , contending that the
Brady violation in his case was the "obvious" consequence
of failing to provide specific Brady training and that
this "obviousness" showing can substitute for the pattern
of violations ordinarily necessary to establish municipal
culpability. In Canton , the Court theorized that if a
city armed its police force and deployed them into the
public to capture fleeing felons without training the officers
in the constitutional limitation on the use of deadly force,
the failure to train could reflect the city's deliberate
indifference to the highly predictable consequence, namely,
violations of constitutional rights. Failure to train prosecutors
in their Brady obligations does not fall within the narrow
range of Canton 's hypothesized single-incident liability.
The obvious need for specific legal training present in
Canton 's scenario--police academy applicants are unlikely
to be familiar with constitutional constraints on deadly
force and, absent training, cannot obtain that knowledge--is
absent here. Attorneys are trained in the law and equipped
with the tools to interpret and apply legal principles,
understand constitutional limits, and exercise legal judgment.
They receive training before entering the profession, must
usually satisfy continuing education requirements, often
train on the job with more experienced attorneys, and must
satisfy licensing standards and ongoing ethical obligations.
Prosecutors not only are equipped but are ethically bound
to know what Brady entails and to perform legal research
when they are uncertain. Thus, recurring constitutional
violations are not the "obvious consequence" of failing
to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training. The
nuance of the allegedly necessary training also distinguishes
the case from the example in Canton . Here, the prosecutors
were familiar with the general Brady rule. Thus, Thompson
cannot rely on the lack of an ability to cope with constitutional
situations that underlies the Canton hypothetical, but
must assert that prosecutors were not trained about particular
Brady evidence or the specific scenario related to the
violation in his case. That sort of nuance simply cannot
support an inference of deliberate indifference here. Contrary
to the holding below, it does not follow that, because
Brady has gray areas and some Brady decisions are difficult,
prosecutors will so obviously make wrong decisions that
failing to train them amounts, as it must, to "a decision
by the city itself to violate the Constitution." Canton,
489 U. S., at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Pp. 11-19.
578 F. 3d 293, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito,
J., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.